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ENCOURAGING ABANDONMENT: THE TREND TOWARDS
ALLOWING PARENTS TO DROP OFF UNWANTED NEWBORNS
MICHAEL S. RAUM AND JEFFREY L. SKAARE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Laura Rafferty, then a twenty-year-old student at North Dakota
State University, gave birth to a girl on April 22, 1998.1 Almost two
years later, on April 24, 2000, she was charged with negligent homicide
in connection with the newborn's death. 2 According to investigators,
Rafferty gave birth to the child in the shower at her sorority house and
cut its umbilical cord with scissors. 3 Next, she allegedly wrapped the
baby in a towel and brought it to her room, where she left it, under her
bed and covered with a blanket, while she went to class.4 When she
returned, the baby was dead.5 Rafferty then allegedly disposed of the
body in a dumpster on her way to an afternoon class. 6 The baby's body
was never found, despite a police search of the Fargo landfill.7 On June
28, 2000, Rafferty entered a so-called Alford guilty plea, conceding that
prosecutors had sufficient evidence for a conviction but not admitting
guilt in the baby's death.8 The judge accepted the plea and sentenced
Rafferty to one year in prison, suspended, and three years on supervised
probation, including a psychological and psychiatric evaluation and
follow-up treatment. 9
This is not the only case of its type in North Dakota in recent years.
In November 1999, the body of a boy, believed to be two weeks old, was
* The authors are 2000 graduates of the University of North Dakota School of Law. Michael
Raum serves as a law clerk to Chief Judge Rodney Webb of the Federal District of North Dakota, in
Fargo, North Dakota. Jeffrey Skaare practices with the law firm of Pearson Christensen in Grand
Forks, North Dakota.
1. See John MacDonald, Student Charged in Baby Dumping Case, GRAND FORKS HERALD (Grand
Forks, N.D.), Apr. 25, 2000, at B6.
2. See Jack Sullivan, Woman Accused of Killing Newborn at NDSU Sorority House Pleads Not
Guilty, FORUM (Fargo, N.D.), Apr. 28, 2000, at B 1. Rafferty pleaded not guilty on April 28. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id. It is disputed whether the baby was alive when Rafferty left it under her bed. See id
She first told police that it never moved nor made noise, but she later conceded that it "did cry and
make a few whimpers." Id. However, she did not elaborate further, only nodding when asked if an
accident made the baby stop crying. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See Ellen Crawford, Woman Sentenced in Baby's Death, FORUM (Fargo, N.D.), June 29, 2000,
at AI. In an Alford plea, the defendant pleads guilty without expressly admitting guilt. See North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970).
9. See id.
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found in a suitcase on the Fort Berthold Indian reservation. 10 The
child's parents have not been found."l
These tragic stories are not unique to North Dakota. News accounts
over recent years have contained many similar incidents. In one high
profile case, two teenagers in 1996 wrapped their newborn in a trash bag
and tossed it in a dumpster outside the Delaware hotel where they went
for the mother to give birth. 12 Similarly, a New York woman recently
received a nineteen-year prison sentence for a similar infanticide, com-
mitted when she was twenty-one years old. 13 Other such stories abound,
typically featuring a young mother who delivers a baby secretly, and
then disposes of it.14 While Rafferty's story varies in its details from
other such incidents, the central theme of a young mother killing or
recklessly abandoning a newborn is disturbingly familiar.15
10. See John MacDonald, Doctors, MeritCare Push for Newborn Safety Laws, FORUM (Fargo,
N.D.), June 4, 2000, at A16 (reviewing recent abandonments in North Dakota).
11. See id.
12. See Doug Most, Grossberg Goes Home; Her Prison Sentence Ends Early, RECORD (Bergen
County, N.J.), May 11, 2000, at At. The mother, Amy Grossberg, was recently released from prison
after serving a total of 22 months of a 30-month sentence; the father, Brian Peterson, had been re-
leased in January after serving a shorter sentence given in return for agreeing to testify against
Grossberg. See id.
13. See Carol DeMare, Mother Gets 19 to Life for Killing Baby, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.),
Apr. 1, 2000, at B 1. Melissa Strawbridge delivered a baby girl in her bathroom, placed it in a plastic
bag and left it in a dumpster. See id.
14. See, e.g., Carl Ingram, Mother Strives to Save Unwanted Babies; L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000,
at A28 (reviewing a number of cases and describing a California woman who has established a grave-
yard for such children, in which she has buried 43 children over four years). In 1998, the United
States Department of Health and Human Services reported 105 abandoned babies were found nation-
wide, 33 of them dead. See Theola S. Labbe, Discovery of Dead Infant Puts Focus on Preventive
Programs, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), May 3, 2000, at B3 (discussing statistics). However, some
suggest the number of dead infants must be much higher, since some bodies are surely never found.
See Ingram, supra (citing supporter's of the Texas legislation, discussed infra, which became the first
in the nation to allow unwanted newborns to be left at hospitals); see also Valerie Richardson, Colora-
do Readies Law Intended to Protect Abandoned Babies, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2000, at CI (citing
experts suggesting the Department of Health and Human Service statistics are too low).
15. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of infanticide in America, see Michelle Ober-
man, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American Infanticide, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1
(1996). The author provides a detailed history of society's and courts' treatment of infanticide, as
well as a catalog of infanticide prosecutions, issues outside the scope of this article. The author's main
theme, however, resonates strongly with the subject of this article: laws designed to prevent infanticide
by allowing parents to abandon their children safely to the state. As she writes:
These cases [of infanticide] came to evoke a profound ambivalence in me. On the one
hand, the killings seemed uniquely horrific, unprovoked, and incomprehensible. Yet the
more I thought about them, the less I knew where to direct my anger. Although the
babies died at their mothers' hands, many others should be implicated in their deaths-
the fathers, grandparents, friends, schools and workplaces, and society as a whole. As
puzzling as it was undeniable, I often found myself empathizing with these killers.
... I discovered that my empathy for these women was shared by the judges and
juries who determined the fates of the girls and women charged with killing their
offspring. The rhetoric of moral outrage expressed by society at large and by judges and
juries in individual cases is accompanied by an equally strong tendency to view these
crimes as arising out of external circumstances, and therefore to resist equating these
homicides with murder.
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These incidents have helped to spark a series of laws aimed at
preventing infanticide by allowing parents to leave their children at
designated "safe havens," typically hospitals, within a short period after
their birth, guaranteeing in return anonymity and immunity from
prosecution for abandonment. 16 To date, twenty-six states have consid-
ered such legislation.17 Twelve states have adopted such a law,18 includ-
ing Minnesota.19 Similar legislation has failed to win approval in nine
states. 20 In five states, a bill to enact abandonment legislation remains in
progress. 21 As will be discussed more fully later, North Dakota may
soon be considering adopting such a law. 22
The first state to adopt this sort of legislation was Texas, which
adopted its "Baby Moses"23 law in June 1999.24 The Texas legislation
was triggered in part by a rash of baby abandonment in the Houston
area: Thirteen babies, three of them dead, were found in the first ten
months of 1999.25 Although Texas passed the first statewide legislation,
similar programs had been available on a smaller scale before. In
Mobile, Alabama, for example, local prosecutors in 1998 agreed not to
file criminal charges against anyone who left a newborn with a hospital;
after this agreement was made public, several babies were left, although
Id. at 4-5. While the author's focus is on the societal treatment of infanticide, rather than efforts
to prevent it, this notion that infanticide is, in a sense at least, inevitable and externally motivated
underlies much of the argument for newborn abandonment laws. Viewed this way, only a belief in the
inevitability of such acts could justify a comprehensive scheme to prevent them.
16. See Richardson, supra note 14 (discussing the trend of laws proposed around the nation).
17. See infra notes 38-49, 53-66, and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
19. See 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421.
20. See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
22. See MacDonald, supra note 10 (discussing a move by several doctors to encourage the North
Dakota Legislature to adopt a baby abandonment law and the willingness of the attorney general's
office to draft such legislation for the 2001 legislative session).
23. The phrase "Baby Moses" has been adopted by many as the shorthand term for legalized
abandonment laws. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 14 (referring to Colorado's law as a "Baby
Moses" bill). Advocates for legalized abandonment have formed the Baby Moses Project, which
provides information about abandonment and laws to combat it. See Baby Moses Project (last visited
June 11, 2000) <http://www.babymoses.org>. According to the organization's web site, the name
"The Baby Moses Project" was chosen
[b]ecause, in addition to being placed in a basket, Moses was also carefully watched
over by an anonymous protector until he was safely placed in the arms of an individual
who could provide the love and care necessary for life. Those involved with this project
and Texas HB 3423, also want unwanted newborns to be safely handled by parents and
others who can provide them with a sheltered, safe environment, and in addition, provide
anonymity to a parent or parents who choose a responsible alternative to abandonment.
Id.
24. See 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 1087, § 2 (codified at TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 262.301-262.303)
(Vernon Supp. 2000)). Texas Governor George W. Bush signed the bill into law on June 19, 1999.
25. See Ingrain, supra note 14 (discussing the Texas legislation); see also Baby Moses Project
(last visited June 11, 2000) <http://www.babymoses.org> (discussing the history and motivation behind
the Texas law).
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at least one has since been found dead. 26 The Minnesota legislation
grew out of a similar program.27
While there has been widespread support for such laws, as shown by
the number of states considering them, they have not been without
critics. 28 In Colorado, for example, which passed its version of a Baby
Moses bill this year,2 9 House Republicans split their votes 19-21, with
some arguing the law constituted government approval of
abandonment. 30 One of those opposed criticized the law on the grounds
that it would "elevate abandonment into a new fundamental right." 31
Those who favored the bill countered that it merely reflected the harsh
reality of an imperfect society, stressing that saving babies is more
important than holding to principles.32
However, it is not clear that the bills are effective. Some suggest that
the targets of the bill-confused, terrified teenage mothers desperate
enough to kill their children-are not likely to know the law or to drive
26. See Twila Decker, A Chance at Life: An Out for Mothers in Crisis, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Mar. 12, 2000, at IF. In addition to discussing the development of the program, the article recounts the
story of "Baby Nick," who was dropped off by a teenage mother at a hospital on Christmas Eve; he
was adopted a few months later. See id.
27. See Minnesota Starts Hospital Program to Allow Mothers to Leave Unwanted Newborns,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 7, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2708820.
28. These arguments were summarized aptly by the originally proposed version of a Tennessee
House Resolution, which as passed merely calls for a study of the issue:
WHEREAS, the issue of child abandonment is of vital concern to citizens throughout
Tennessee and affects the lives of children daily; and
WHEREAS, Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 39-15-401, states that any person
who knowingly, other than by accidental means, treats a child under the age of seven in
such a manner as to inflict injury, or neglects such child so as to adversely affect the
child's health and welfare, commits a Class D felony; and
WHEREAS, supporters of legislation to ease the surrender of abandoned children,
and eliminate prosecution associated therewith, argue that mothers who abandon their
babies often hide their pregnancy and do not receive prenatal care, resulting in babies
being born with serious health problems that demand prompt attention; and
WHEREAS, they further contend that offering alternatives to new parents who are
overwhelmed by the immediate responsibilities of caring for a baby would encourage
more parents to deliver their newborns to safe havens rather than abandon them to die; at
the same time giving them complete anonymity and freedom from prosecution; and
WHEREAS, opponents argue that such freedom of prosecution would do little to
remedy the problem of abandoned newborns; would result in inadequate information to
notify or involve the biological father, and would result in inadequate information to
enable others to care for or adopt such child; and that the law, if enacted, should apply to
older children as well, who are often as defenseless as newborn children ....
H.R. Res. 204, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2000) (adopted June 7, 2000). This resolution
illustrates the arguments played out for and against Baby Moses laws over the following paragraphs.
29. Act of June 3, 2000, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 384, at 2903 (codified as amended at COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 18-6-401, 19-3-304.5 (2000)).
30. See Richardson, supra note 14 (describing the Colorado debate).
31. See Richardson, supra note 14 (quoting Rep. Mark Paschall).
32. See Richardson, supra note 14 (quoting Rep. Gayle Berry, a Republican sponsor of the bill:
"I wish we lived in a perfect society where the events that gave rise to this bill didn't exist. But it is a
reality, and as uncomfortable as it is, we need to focus on a safe haven for unwanted babies.").
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to a prescribed site to leave their children.33 Further, no babies have
been dropped off at designated sites under the Texas law, while several
have been found dead. 34 Additionally, the bills have been criticized on
the grounds that children dropped off under them will never be able to
find out who their parents were or details of their medical histories. 35
Following this line of argument, several adoptee-rights organizations
have released statements condemning the laws.36
These arguments will likely be played out in the North Dakota
legislature over the upcoming session, as the attorney general's office
has said it will follow the wishes of several hospitals in the state and have
Baby Moses legislation drafted and introduced. 37 Thus, a review of the
legislation proposed around the country, as well as a discussion of the
current state of the law in North Dakota likely to be affected by such
legislation, is appropriate. This Article endeavors to undertake such a
review.
Part II reviews the legislation proposed around the country, includ-
ing both those bills that have passed as well as those that have failed or
are still pending. This discussion will analyze Baby Moses legislation by
discussing how different proposals approach a number of issues each
such law must address, pointing out variations in approach and
discussing the implications of each. Part II will review the family law
framework into which any North Dakota legislation would fit. This
section will review the various laws likely to be affected by a Baby Moses
law and will discuss how each would be affected.
33. See Adam Pertman, Politicians Push for Legalized Baby Abandonment at 'Safe' Sites-Critics
Decry Initiatives' Merits, Effectiveness, BOSTON G LOBE, Apr. 10, 2000, at B 1, available at 2000 WL
3321463.
34. See id. (quoting critics of Baby Moses bills).
35. See id.
36. See Statement from the American Adoption Congress re: Abandoned Baby Legislation (last
visited June 11, 2000) <http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org/abandoned-baby.htm>; see also
Statement of the Executive Committee of Bastard Nation on Legalized Abandonment Laws (last visited
June 11, 2000) <http://www.bastards.org/activismlegalized-abandonment.html>. The portion of the
Bastard Nation statement directly addressing the issue of a lack of information for abandoned
newborn subsequently adopted reads:
These laws represent a radical change in child welfare policy toward promoting rather
than discouraging abandonment. These laws also run counter to the spirit, and perhaps
the letter, of many statutes and initiatives, such as relinquishment revocation periods and
putative birthfather registries, that empower all parties involved in a child's life to make
informed choices regarding the child's best interest. The anonymity built into these laws
opens up the door to the potential for abuse, fraud, and the worst excesses of the past,
when abandonment was the norm.
Id.
37. See MacDonald, supra note 10 (quoting Attorney General Heitkamp as expressing willing-
ness to draft such legislation).
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II. REVIEW OF PROPOSED AND ADOPTED BABY MOSES
LEGISLATION
The following section focuses on a review of safe haven legislation
proposed and adopted around the country. To date, twenty-six states
have considered safe haven bills in one form or another. Twelve states
have adopted such legislation: Alabama, 38 California, 39 Colorado, 40
Connecticut, 4 1 Florida,42 Indiana,43 Louisiana, 44 Michigan, 45 Minnesota,4 6
South Carolina,47 Texas,48 and West Virginia.49 Additionally, New York
has adopted a kind of safe haven bill.50 While it accomplishes much of
what the bills discussed in this article do, it takes a radically different
approach. Unlike the others, all of which provide details on where chil-
dren may be left, etc., the New York law simply allows parents to leave
children under five days old "with an appropriate person or in a suitable
location and promptly notif[y] an appropriate person of the child's
location." 51 It also provides an affirmative defense to those doing s0.52
Thus, while it is similar to the other laws, the New York enactment will
not be discussed further, as there really is no more detail than that.
Contrarily, nine states considered but did not enact safe haven
legislation, with most of the bills simply dying in committee. These
states are: Delaware, 53 Georgia,54 Kansas, 55 Kentucky,56 New Jersey, 57
38. See H.R. 115, 2000 Reg. Sess., 2000 Ala. Acts 760.
39. See S. 1368, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (enacted Sept. 28, 2000).
40. See Act of June 3, 2000, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 384, at 2903 (codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-6-401, 19-3-304.5 (2000)) (providing for newborn abandonment).
41. See H.R. 5023, 2000 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207.
42. See Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § I (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
383.50(3)).
43. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-2.5 (Michie Supp. 2000).
44. See 2000 La. Acts 109, § I (to be codified at LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1702(2)).
45. See Safe Delivery of Newborns Law, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 232.
46. See 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421.
47. See Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C.
2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85).
48. See 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 1087, § 2 (effective Sept. 1, 1999) (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 262.301-262.303 (Vernon Supp. 2000)).
49. See Act of March 11, 2000, 2000 W. Va. Acts 50 (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-!
(Michie Supp. 2000)).
50. See Abandoned Infant Protection Act, 2000 N.Y. Laws 156 (to be codified at N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 260.03, 260.15; N.Y. Soc. SERv. § 372-g).
51. Id. § 3 (to be codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.03).
52. See id.
53. See H.R. 555, 140th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Sess. (Del. 2000) (session adjourned June 20,
2000, House passed, but Senate laid on table; it is the authors' understanding that once a bill is tabled
and the session adjourns, the bill will not carryover to the next session).
54. See Safe Place for Babies Act, H.R. 1292, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Ga.
2000) (session adjourned March 22, 2000 and bill will not carryover to next session).
55. See Newborn Infant Protection Act, S. 652, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2000) (passed
in Senate, but session adjourned May 24, 2000 and bill will not carryover to next session); H.R. 2927,
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North Carolina, 58 Oklahoma, 59 Tennessee, 60 and Wisconsin.6 1 For
purposes of this analysis, legislation proposed but not passed will be
considered, because it reflects the overall trend and presents variations in
approach to this problem; such failed bills will be referred to as propos-
als or bills, rather than statutes or enactments.
Additionally, bills remain in progress in five states. These will not be
considered, since their final form is not yet determined. The states still
considering legislation are Illinois, 62 Missouri,63 New York, 64 Ohio,65 and
Pennsylvania.66
While no two safe haven bills are exactly the same, all share certain
characteristics. This section will walk through a series of issues with
which each must deal, explaining the major approaches chosen by
different states. Initially, each state must provide some mechanics for an
abandonment. These include where a child may be left, who may leavea
child, and any conditions on which children can be left, notably age.
Additionally, this first section includes a discussion of any procedures to
be followed when accepting a child, especially relating to anonymity
guarantees, disclosures about the effect of leaving a child, and requests
for medical information.
78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2000) (session adjourned May 24, 2000 and bill will not carryover to
next session). Two substantially different bills failed to pass in Kansas; one did not leave the House,
and the other left the Senate, but did not leave the House.
56. See S. 188, 134th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2000) (passed in Senate, but session adjourned
April 14, 2000, and bill will not carryover to next session).
57. See Assemb. 2030, 209th Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2000) (withdrawn from further conside-
ration on September 21, 2000).
58. See Abandoned Infant Protection Act, H.R. 1616, 1999 Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (N.C. 2000)
(session adjourned July 13, 2000, and bill will not carryover to next session).
59. See H.R. 2148, 47th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2000) (passed in House, but session adjourned May
26, 2000, and bill will not carryover to next session).
60. See H.R. 2044, 101st Gen. Assemb., 2000 Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2000) (session adjourned June
28, 2000, and bill will not carryover to next session). Another bill having certain characteristics of a
Baby Moses bill was proposed but withdrawn by its sponsor. See H.R 3112, 101st Gen. Assemb., 2000
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2000). However, it lacked several key components of standard Baby Moses legis-
lation, most notably the guarantee of anonymity for parents leaving children. See id. Rather, it
conditioned immunity from prosecution on providing detailed personal and medical information. See
id.
61. See Assemb. 926, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2000) (failed to pass pursuant to a resolution
that requires further consideration of a bill if it is not passed by a certain date).
62. See S. 1668, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (II1. 2000) (last action was on February 2, 2000,
when the bill was referred to the Senate Rules Committee).
63. See Safe Place for Newborns Act of 2000, H.R. 2134, 90th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2000) (last action on this bill was a public hearing on April 11, 2000).
64. See Assemb. 9517, 223d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2000) (last action was on June 12, 2000,
when bill was referred to Assembly Rules Committee). As discussed above, New York has also
already passed a type of safe haven bill. See supra note 50. The proposed bill shares more of the
characteristics of typical safe haven laws.
65. See H.R. 660, 123d Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2000) (last action was on
September 20, 2000, when bill passed in the House).
66. See H.R. 2322, 184th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2000) (last action was on
March 7, 2000, when bill was referred to the House Judiciary Committee).
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Second, each bill provides for a process for dealing with children
accepted at safe havens. Typically, this involves transferring custody to
the state's child protection agency, which then must follow a series of
steps, including petitioning the court to terminate parental rights and
seeking a permanent home for the child. These procedures vary widely
between states, and they are usually keyed to each state's child protec-
tion statutes, a general review of which is beyond the scope of this
analysis. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern some wide patterns among
approaches to these issues, which this section will discuss briefly.
Third, each proposal or law must provide for what the parents may
do after leaving a child, including their ability to recover the child or par-
ticipate in any future hearings regarding the child's future. States take
radically different approaches to this issue, ranging from no real provi-
sions to detailed procedures. These procedures are reviewed briefly.
The final section addresses immunity provisions for various parties.
While all the statutes provide for some kind of immunity from criminal
and civil liability for parents leaving children, the specifics break down
into several different approaches. As this discussion will address, these
differences may be merely semantic, but there are several clearly dis-
cernible approaches from among which the states choose.
A. THE MECHANICS OF LEGALIZED ABANDONMENT
The following sections will deal with the actual mechanics of
dropping off a child at a safe haven. This discussion includes everything
up to the point that the safe haven has accepted the child and the parent
has left. The first subsection, therefore, will begin by discussing what
constitutes a "safe haven." The second subsection focuses on who may
drop off a child, while the third discusses what children may be dropped
off. The final subsection examines procedures to be followed by safe
havens when accepting a child from a parent. Section B, infra, will
discuss procedures that the safe haven follows once it has accepted the
child.
1. What are Safe Havens?
The first question any safe haven law .must answer is what constitutes
a safe haven: Where can parents leave children? As an initial matter, it is
worth noting that all the bills make accepting children mandatory, thus
requiring any person or institution lawfully designated as a safe haven to
allow parents to leave children. 67 As a general matter, all states that have
67. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304.5(1) (2000) (stating that firefighters at fire stations and
hospital staff members at a hospital "shall, without a court order, take temporary physical custody of
518 [VOL. 76:511
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passed or considered such legislation include hospitals and other similar
facilities in their definitions of a safe haven. Some states include other
locations, such as fire, ambulance, and police stations, while others limit
havens only to hospitals.
There are eight states whose enactments or proposals limit safe
havens to hospitals or similar facilities. The Alabama, 68 Indiana, 69
Minnesota, 70 South Carolina,71 Texas, 72 and West Virginia 73 legislation,
as well as the Oklahoma 74 proposal, provide only for children to be left
at a hospital or similar facility, typically any such facility licensed
pursuant to state law.75 In Connecticut, hospitals must designate a place
in the emergency room where children are to be left, must designate all
members of the emergency room nursing staff as "employees
authorized to take custody" of children, and must have one such
authorized employee on duty at all times. 76 In these states, presumably,
a child could not legally be left anywhere else-the safe haven is a
limited one, often by reference to state licensing laws.77 However, as a
practical matter, one wonders whether a frightened new mother, desper-
ate enough to give away her newborn, would be able to distinguish an
authorized medical facility from an unauthorized one. Further, it seems
unlikely that a prosecutor would be willing to press charges against a
mother who attempts to leave a child at an unauthorized hospital by
mistake, especially in light of the presumably strong legislative policy
favoring legalized abandonment over more drastic alternatives, most
obviously killing a child. These limitations, therefore, may be relatively
meaningless insofar as they purport to limit a parent's ability to leave a
child with only certain hospitals or medical facilities.
[an eligible child]"); see also 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § 1 (to be codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 145.902(1)) ("A hospital... shall receive a newborn left with a hospital employee ... .
68. See H.R. 115. 2000 Reg. Sess., 2000 Ala. Acts 760, § 4.
69. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-2.5-1 (Michie Supp. 2000) (calling for "emergency medical
services providers" to accept children).
70. See 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § I (codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.902(1)) ("A
hospital ... shall receive a newborn left with a hospital employee .... ").
71. See Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1
(S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(A)) (authorizing drop-offs at "a hospital or
outpatient facility operating in this state").
72. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.301(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000) ("An emergency medical
services provider.., shall, without a court order, take possession of a child .... ").
73. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-1 (Michie Supp. 2000) (allowing for children to be left at "a
hospital or health care facility").
74. See H.R. 2148, 47th Leg., 2d Sess. § I (Okla. 2000) (providing that "any medical provider
shall receive physical custody of a newborn infant").
75. See, e.g., 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § 1 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.902(1))
("A hospital licensed under sections 144.50 to 144.56 shall receive a newborn left with a hospital
employee ... ").
76. See H.R. 5023, 2000 Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, § 1.
77. See supra notes 68-74, 76.
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The other 'thirteen enactments and proposals expand their
definitions of a safe haven beyond hospitals, although each does include
hospitals and similar facilities. Colorado, 78 Florida, 79 and the Georgia
proposal80 allow children to be left at fire stations. The Delaware
proposal allowed for abandonment at fire stations and paramedic
stations,8 1 while the New Jersey proposal added police stations. 82 The
Tennessee proposal called for "safety officers" and "members of the
professional medical community" to take children. 83 The Kansas House
proposal would have allowed children to be left with ambulance service
providers, 84 while the Wisconsin proposal authorized all law enforcement
officers and emergency medical technicians to receive children. 85 The
Michigan law, as well as the Kentucky proposal, allow parents to leave
children at both fire and police stations in addition to emergency medi-
cal service providers. 86 The California enactment adds to hospitals "any
additional location designated by the county board of supervisors by
resolution." 87 The Kansas Senate proposal, in addition to fire stations
and hospitals, designated all city and county health departments as safe
havens. 88
Finally, Louisiana's law and North Carolina's proposal contain the
broadest definitions of a safe haven. Louisiana's law allows drop-offs at
any designated "emergency care facility," defined in the statute to
mean "any hospital licensed in the state of Louisiana, any public health
unit, any fire station, any police station, or any pregnancy crisis facil-
ity." 89 North Carolina's proposal provided for drop-offs with "any
other adult of suitable discretion who willingly accepts the infant." 90
This perhaps reflects the notion that, once a state has decided to allow
mothers who might be likely to abandon their children to do so legally,
the law should make doing so as easy and convenient as possible, so as to
78. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304.5(1) (2000) (allowing parents to leave children with
firefighters at fire stations or a hospital staff member at a hospital).
79. See Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § I (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
383.50(3)) (allowing children to be left at "each fire station staffed with full-time firefighters or
emergency medical technicians").
80. See Safe Place for Babies Act, H.R. 1292, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § I
(Ga. 2000).
81. See H.R. 555, 140th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Sess. § I (Del. 2000).
82. See Assemb. 2030, 209th Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. § 4(a), (b) (N.J. 2000).
83. See H.R. 2044, 101st Gen. Assemb., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 2 (Tenn. 2000).
84. See H.R. 2927, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 2 (Kan. 2000).
85. See Assemb. 926, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wis. 2000).
86. See Safe Delivery of Newborns Law, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 232, § l(2)(e); S. 188, 134th
Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ky. 2000).
87. See S. 1368, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2000) (enacted Sept. 28, 2000).
88. See Newborn Infant Protection Act, S. 652, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 1(b) (Kan. 2000).
89. See 2000 La. Acts 109, § I (to be codified at LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1702(2)).
90. Abandoned Infant Protection Act, H.R. 1616, 1999 Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 6 (N.C. 2000).
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maximize the chance that children will be saved. 'This is especially
logical if combined with the probability, discussed above, that pros-
ecutors would be unlikely to pursue those who leave children in the
technically wrong place. If this is so, Louisiana seems to have the ideal
enactment, allowing children to be left at virtually all public facilities.
2. Who May Leave Children?
While it might seem obvious that only parents can leave their
newborn children at safe havens, several enactments and proposals seem
to contemplate that someone other than a parent might do so. However,
the vast majority of states-seven enactments and six proposals-do in
fact limit those eligible to leave children to the child's parents. This is
the case in the laws enacted by Alabama, 91 Colorado, 92 Florida,9 3
Indiana,94 Michigan, 95 Texas,96 and West Virginia.97 Additionally, the
proposals in Georgia, 98  the Kansas House, 99 North Carolina, ,00
Oklahoma,' 0 ' Tennessee,102 and Wisconsin103 contain similar language.
Generally, this limitation appears in the basic language authorizing
drop-offs and designating safe havens by requiring designated safe
havens to take custody of a child delivered by its parent.104 However,
only one act contains any language regarding how one would be
determined to be the child's parent, a point discussed further below.
That proposal, Oklahoma's, required the person leaving the child to state
91. See H.R. 115, 2000 Reg. Sess., 2000 Ala. Acts 760, § 1(a) (allowing children to be accepted
if "delivered to the provider by the child's parent").
92. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-304.5(1) (2000) (allowing parents to leave children with fire-
fighters at fire stations or a hospital staff member at a hospital).
93. See Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § 1 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
383.5(2)).
94. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-2.5-1(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 2000).
95. See Safe Delivery of Newborns Law, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 232, § 3.
96. See TEx. F~A. CODE ANN. § 262.301(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
97. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-1 (Michie Supp. 2000).
98. See Safe Place for Babies Act, H.R. 1292, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § 1
(Ga. 2000) ("It is the express purpose and intent of the General Assembly in enacting this chapter to
prevent injuries to and deaths of newborn children that are caused by a parent who abandons the child
immediately after his or her birth.").
99. See Newborn Infant Protection Act, S. 652, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 2(a) (Kan. 2000).
100. See Abandoned Infant Protection Act, H.R. 1616, 1999 Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 2 (N.C.
2000).
101. See H.R. 2148, 47th Leg., 2d Sess. § 1 (Okla. 2000) (exempting from criminal liability any
parent who complies with safe haven procedures).
102. See H.R. 2044, 101st Gen. Assemb., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 4 (Tenn. 2000) (requiring members
of the medical community and safety officers to take children from "a parent who is presently entitled
to possession of the child").
103. See Assemb. 926, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wis. 2000).
104. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-304.5(1) (2000) ("If a parent voluntarily delivers a child
to a [safe haven, a person at the safe haven] shall, without a court order, take temporary physical
custody of the child ....").
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that he or she was the child's parent, although it did not require such
parent to provide any other information, including his or her name. 105
Four laws and three proposals expressly allow someone other than a
parent to leave the child. However, all but one assures that anyone
besides the parent is acting at the request of the parent. Uniquely, the
Delaware proposal simply allowed "a person" to leave a child, without
any of the qualifying language discussed below.106 Connecticut explicit-
ly limits those who can leave a child to "the parent or lawful agent of the
parent."10 7 The Minnesota statute initially refers to "the mother or the
person leaving the newborn." 108 Later, however, it guarantees immunity
from criminal liability only to those who have the mother's approval, to
leave the child. 109 Like the Minnesota enactment, the South Carolina
statute initially refers simply to "a person" who leaves a newborn, but it
exempts from criminal liability someone leaving a child only if he or she
is a parent or acting at the direction of a parent. 10  The New Jersey
proposal contained similar provisions."I' Both the California law and the
Kansas Senate proposal similarly referred to "a parent or other person
having lawful custody of an infant," presumably meaning someone with
permission of a parent.112
Grammatically unique among the enactments is Louisiana's, which
couches its drop-off authorization language entirely in the passive tense:
"Where a newborn infant is left in the care of any individual at a desig-
nated emergency care facility with no affirmative expression that some-
one intends to return for the child, such act shall be designated
relinquishment of a newborn." 113 This would seem at first blush to indi-
cate a broad conception of who can leave the child-anyone, pres-
umably, would be acceptable. However, later provisions suggest that this
may not be the case. The statute gives any mother who has left her child,
and a father who knew of her decision to do so thirty days in which to re-
voke the decision to do so, and it gives a father who did not have notice
105. See H.R. 2148, 47th Leg., 2d Sess. § I (Okla. 2000) (providing anonymity for someone
leaving a newborn, but requiring him or her to state that he or she is the newborn's parent).
106. See H.R. 555, 140th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Sess. § 5 (Del. 2000).
107. H.R. 5023, 2000 Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, § 2(a).
108. 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § I (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.902(1)(b)).
109. See 2000 Minn. Laws 612, ch. 421, § 3 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 609.3785(b)).
110. See Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2
(S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(A), (G)(1)) (requiring hospitals to accept
newborns voluntarily left with the hospital by "a person who does not express an intent to return for
the infant" but limiting immunity to parents and those acting at the direction of a parent).
S11. See Assemb. 2030, 209th Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. § 4 (N.J. 2000).
112. See S. 1368, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2000) (enacted Sept. 28, 2000); Newborn Infant
Protection Act, S. 652, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 1(b) (Kan. 2000).
113. 2000 La. Acts 109, § 1 (to be codified at LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1703(A)).
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of the abandonment a year in which to recover the child.114 By not pro-
viding for a mother who did not personally relinquish her child, the
statute seems to suggest that this could not happen, presumably because
only a mother, or mother and father together, could relinquish the
child.1 15 Therefore, it is likely the Louisiana statute, like those discussed
above, actually authorizes only parents to leave their children. 116
Each of these provisions requires that the person leaving the child
have some type of relationship with that child, either a parent or some-
one in lawful possession. However, with the exception of Oklahoma,' 1 7
all of the acts guarantee either complete or such expansive anonymity to
those leaving children that they need not identify themselves or their
relationship with the child, a subject which will be addressed in full
below. Thus, at least to the extent that this status is what enables the safe
haven to accept the child, it seems counter-intuitive to require that the
person dropping off the child be a parent or have authority to do so.
After all, how could a hospital receiving a child anonymously know if
the parent leaving it was lawfully entitled to possession of the child?
It is likely that the intent of these provisions is simply to exclude
anyone not entitled to have the child in the first place from the criminal
and civil immunity enjoyed by parents complying with the act.118 How-
ever, for this to take place, one must posit that someone not entitled to do
so leaves a child; the real parent subsequently discovers this and attempts
to recover the child; and the one who dropped it off illegally is identi-
fied. Even if this were to happen, such a person would surely be guilty
of crimes beyond abandoning the child, such as kidnapping. However, it
would seem illogical to draft a statute which did not at least refer to
parents, as that is the group the legislature clearly intends to be benefit.
Therefore, these provisions become unavoidable, but unavoidably empty,
words: Requiring that a totally anonymous person be identified as
anything is, as a practical matter, probably impossible.
3. What Children May be Abandoned?
While the preceding section addressed who is eligible to leave a
newborn child at a safe haven, this section focuses on what children may
be left. Essentially, there are two main limitations imposed: An age limit,
which all states have, and a prohibition against accepting abused chil-
114. See 2000 La. Acts 109, § 1 (to be codified at LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1705).
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See H.R. 2148, 47th Leg., 2d Sess. § 1 (Okla. 2000) (providing anonymity for someone
leaving a newborn, but requiring him or her to state that he or she is the newborn's parent).
118. See infra Part I.D.
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dren, present in a minority of state bills. Additionally, a number of bills
and enactments require that the parent express an intent not to return,
and South Carolina requires additionally that "the circumstances give
rise to a reasonable belief that the person does not intend to return for
the infant."11 9 However, these provisions do not truly add any condi-
tions to leaving a newborn; they merely require that one abandoning a
newborn plan to abandon it. Therefore, they will not be considered in
this section.
First, all states establish a maximum age limit for accepting newborn
children. With the exception of the Delaware, Kansas Senate, and North
Carolina proposals, this age limit is either thirty days or three days,
sometimes expressed as seventy-two hours.120 The majority of states
establish an age of thirty days. This is true for the laws in
Connecticut,121 Indiana, 122 Louisiana, 123 South Carolina,124 Texas, 125 and
West Virginia,126 as well as the Kansas House,1 27 New Jersey,128
Tennessee,129 and Wisconsin 1 30 proposals. Contrarily, six states'
laws-Alabama, 131 California,132 Colorado, 133 Florida,134 Michigan,135
119. Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C.
2000) (to be codified at S.C. CoDE ANN. § 20-7-85(A)). Ten other states' bills or enactments contain
such a provision: Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304.5(1)(b) (2000); H.R. 5023,
2000 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, § 2; IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-2.5-1(a)(2) (Michie
Supp. 2000); H.R. 2927, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2000); S. 188, 134th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess.
(Ky. 2000); Abandoned Infant Protection Act, H.R. 1616, 1999 Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 2 (N.C.
2000); H.R. 2148, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2000); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.301(a) (Vernon
Supp. 2000); WEST VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-1 (Michie Supp. 2000); Assemb. 926, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wis. 2000).
120. The Delaware proposal allowed children up to 14 days old to be left. See H.R. 555, 140th
Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Sess. § 1 (Del. 2000). The Kansas Senate proposal provided for an age of
45 days. See Newborn Infant Protection Act, S. 652, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § I(a) (Kan. 2000).
The North Carolina proposal required that the infant be less than 15 days of age. See Abandoned
Infant Protection Act, H.R. 1616, 1999 Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 2 (N.C. 2000).
121. See H.R. 5023, 2000 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, § 2.
122. See IND. CODE ANN. 31-34-2.5-1(a) (Michie Supp. 2000).
123. See 2000 La. Acts 109, § 1 (to be codified at LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1702(3)).
124. See Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2
(S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(J)).
125. See Tax. FAm. CODE ANN. § 262.301(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
126. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-1 (Michie Supp. 2000).
127. See H.R. 2927, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 2 (Kan. 2000).
128. See Assemb. 2030, 209th Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. § 4(a), (b) (N.J. 2000).
129. See H.R. 2044, 101st Gen. Assemb., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 3 (Tenn. 2000).
130. See Assemb. 926, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wis. 2000).
131. See H.R. 115, 2000 Reg. Sess., 2000 Ala. Acts 760, § 1(a).
132. See S. 1368, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2000) (enacted Sept. 28, 2000).
133. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304.5(l)(a) (2000).
134. See Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § 1 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
383.50(1)).
135. See Safe Delivery of Newborns Law, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 232, § 1(2)0).
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and Minnesota136-and the Georgia,137 Kentucky,1 38 and Oklahoma139
proposals, establish an eligible age of three days, sometimes expressed as
seventy-two hours.
Thus, one who left a child outside the age limit, whether it is three
days or thirty days, presumably could be prosecuted for abandonment,
since he or she would be outside the scope of the statute. As a practical
matter, however, these limits may amount merely to approximations,
since the statutes' anonymity guarantees mean parents need not tell pre-
cisely when the child was born and a four-day-old or thirty-one-day-old
child is likely indistinguishable from one three or thirty days old.
Several states do attempt to clear up this ambiguity. For example,
Florida requires that a physician reasonably believes the child to be three
days old or younger, 14 0 and both Minnesota and Michigan similarly
require that the newborn be reasonably determined by a doctor to be
seventy-two hours old.141 The Kentucky proposal also defined
"newborn" as "an infant who is medically determined to be less than
seventy-two (72) hours old,"142 and the Indiana law requires that the
child be, "or appear to be, not more than thirty (30) days old." 143 Even
these modifications may be meaningless, however. Florida, for example,
requires that a physician reasonably believe the child is three days or
younger, but authorizes children to be left anonymously at fire stations,
meaning that by the time a physician determines it to be older than three
days, the parents will be gone.144 Thus, the age limits are perhaps better
viewed as rough approximations, even when a law or bill specifies a
method for making that approximation.
Assuming the practicality of enforcing the age limit, however, it is
important to ask why some states choose thirty days, while others opt for
the much-reduced time frame of three days. To the extent that the laws
target the frightened teenage girl who has given birth and, in fear and
desperation, might immediately kill or abandon her baby, three days
seems more logical.145 This is precisely the situation in several of the
136. See 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § I (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.902(1)(a)).
137. See Safe Place for Babies Act, H.R. 1292, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § I
(Ga. 2000).
138. See S. 188, 134th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ky. 2000).
139. See H.R. 2148, 47th Leg., 2d Sess. § I (Okla. 2000).
140. See Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § I (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
383.50(1)).
141. See 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § 1 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.902(1)(a)
(1)); Safe Delivery of Newborns Law, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 232, § 1(2)0).
142. S. 188, 134th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § I (Ky. 2000).
143. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-2.5-1(a) (Michie Supp. 2000).
144. See Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § I (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
383.50(1), (3)).
145. See Richardson, supra note 14 (discussing background of Baby Moses legislation in
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high profile cases discussed supra, including the case which occurred
recently in North Dakota, and which are frequently cited as the inspira-
tion for Baby Moses, legislation. 146 Contrarily, a thirty-day time frame
seems to assume that one might give birth and try to raise the child for a
short time, but ultimately decide that this is impossible and seek to
abandon it. Intuitively, this seems, while clearly not impossible, less
likely than the first scenario.
The thirty-day time frame might, however, be justified merely as a
safety net, an effort to provide for the rare case of a child left after the
mother or both parents tried and failed to handle raising it. However,
such a long time limit may also open the door to abuse by those not
within the statute's target: Parents who want to avoid the responsibility of
raising a disabled child, for example, could presumably abandon their
child to the state and walk away from it.147 This would presumably be
outside the intent of the newborn abandonment statutes, which are a
reaction to newborns abandoned and killed by frightened new parents.
The other main eligibility condition some states impose is a require-
ment that the newborn not be abused or show any signs of abuse or
neglect. This provision is present in two enactments-Florida,1 48 and
Minnesota 149-and three proposals-Delaware,150 Georgia,151 and the
Kansas Senatel 52 proposal. All of the provisions take the same basic
form, providing that a child will be accepted by a safe haven only if he
or she is unharmed or does not show signs of abuse.153 Additionally,
they condition the guarantees of anonymity and immunity from prose-
cution on the child's health; if he or she has been harmed, the parents
Colorado and other states).
146. See MacDonald, supra note 10 (discussing doctors' and hospitals' call for safe haven legis-
lation in North Dakota based on cases of immediate abandonment).
147. Recently, a wealthy couple left their severely handicapped 10-year-old at a Delaware hos-
pital with a note explaining that they could no longer handle the emotional and physical toll of his care.
See CEO, Wife Offer No Explanation as Son Left Behind, SEATrLE TIMES, Dec. 29, 1999, at A4. The
couple is being prosecuted under Delaware law. While this child was much older than 20 days, this
incident still makes a point about child abandonment laws: Under the 30-day proposals someone could
have left the child without consequences if he or she did not want to care for an unhealthy child. See,
e.g., H.R. 5023, 2000 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, § 2. This would be true,
theoretically, even if the person was not a frightened teenage girl, but merely someone who did not
want the inconvenience of an unhealthy child. See id.
148. See Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § 1 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
383.50(5)).
149. See 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § 1 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.902(l)(a)-
(2)).
150. See H.R. 555, 140th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Sess. § I (Del. 2000).
151. See Safe Place for Babies Act, H.R. 1292, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § 1
(Ga. 2000).
152. See Newborn Infant Protection Act, S. 652, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § l(b) (Kan. 2000).
153. See, e.g., 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § I (to be codified at Mum. STAT. § 145.902(1)-
(a)(2)) ("A hospital ... shall receive a newborn left with a hospital employee on the hospital premises,
provided that: ... the newborn is left in an unharmed condition.").
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are subject to subsequent prosecution.154 Thus, by negative implication,
parents in states without abuse provisions would be immune from any
prosecution for abuse if they otherwise complied with the requirements
of leaving a child at a safe haven.
4. Anonymity Guarantees and Procedures for Accepting
Newborns
A key component of Baby Moses legislation is the anonymity it
guarantees: One may leave a newborn at a safe haven without identifying
oneself by name, let alone leaving any other details about oneself.155 In
fact, some of the laws go so far as to state explicitly that a parent may
leave the safe haven at any time and may not be followed or pursued. 156
Proponents of such legislation usually list these features as one of the
key points in its favor, arguing that parents inclined to give information
about themselves can go the usual adoption route, but that this provides
an alternative to those desperate enough to kill their newborns.157
Contrarily, some critics, notably adoption advocacy groups, argue that
this feature is among such legislation's least attractive features, since it
ensures that children left pursuant to it will never be able to obtain
information about their health backgrounds or that of their biological
parents.158 In response to this concern, some laws provide that those
accepting children should either seek information from or make infor-
mation available to those leaving children.159 This section will examine
those provisions, as well as the general anonymity features of safe haven
legislation.
Virtually every Baby Moses law and proposal either expressly
guarantees or otherwise provides for anonymity for the parents or the
person leaving the child. Generally, these anonymity provisions come in
154. See, e.g., 2000 Minn. Laws 612, ch. 421, § 3 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 609.3785).
155. See, e.g., 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § 1 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.902(1)(b)).
156. See, e.g., Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § 1 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
383.50(5)).
157. See, e.g., Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, preamble ("Whereas, anonymity,
confidentiality, and freedom from prosecution for parents may encourage them to leave a newborn
safely and thus save the infants life.").
158. See Statement from the American Adoption Congress re: Abandoned Baby Legislation (last
visited June 11, 2000) <http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org/abandoned-baby.htm>; see also
Statement of the Executive Committee of Bastard Nation on Legalized Abandonment Laws (last visited
June 11, 2000) <http://www.bastards.org/activism/iegalized-abandonment.html>. A Bastard Nation
statement reads: "The anonymity built into these laws opens up the door to the potential for abuse,
fraud, and the worst excesses of the past, when abandonment was the norm." Statement of the
Executive Committee of Bastard Nation on Legalized Abandonment Laws (last visited June 11, 2000)
<http://www.bastards.org/activism/legalized-abandonment.html>.
159. See, e.g., Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. § 2 (S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(B)(2)).
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three basic forms. In the first group, anonymity is essentially guaranteed
by the lack of any provision regarding identification of a parent and
provisions for termination of parental rights and adoption of the child
without any notice to the parents. For example, the Colorado law is
silent as to identification, providing only that a parent may leave a child
without being prosecuted for abandonment.1 6 0 The Alabama, 16 1
California, 162 Indiana,163 Louisiana, 164 and Texas165 legislation are
similarly silent on the subject of anonymity, simply allowing parents to
leave children and then not mentioning those parents again. This is also
the case in the Kansas Senate 166 and House, 167 and Tennessee 168
proposals. Thus, while these laws do not expressly provide for
anonymity, neither do they provide for identification of parents, and by
not mentioning parents again after allowing them to leave children
clearly contemplate that the parents need not be identified and thus will
remain anonymous.
The second set of three laws and five proposals expressly provide
for anonymity, but essentially place the burden of remaining anony-
mous on the parent. Thus, the Connecticut law provides that while the
hospital may ask questions of the parent or the one leaving the child,
"the parent or agent is not required to provide [his or her] name or [any
other] information."1 69 The South Carolina law similarly provides that
"the person leaving the infant is not required to disclose his or her
identity."170 West Virginia's enactment follows the same basic form,
stating that a hospital "may not require the person to identify them-
selves, but shall otherwise respect the person's desire to remain anony-
mous." 17 1  The Delaware,1 72 Georgia,17 3 New Jersey,1 7 4 North
160. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304.5(1)(b) (2000).
161. See H.R. 115, 2000 Reg. Sess., 2000 Ala. Acts 760, § 4.
162. See S. 1368, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2000) (enacted Sept. 28, 2000).
163. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-2.5 (Michie Supp. 2000).
164. See 2000 La. Acts 109, § I (to be codified at LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1702(2)).
165. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.301(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000) ("An emergency medical
services provider ... shall, without a court order, take possession of a child...").
166. See Newborn Infant Protection Act, S. 652, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § I (Kan. 2000).
167. See H.R. 2927, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2000).
168. See H.R. 2044, 101st Gen. Assemb., 2000 Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2000).
169. H.R. 5023, 2000 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, § 2(b).
170. Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2
(S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(A)).
171. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-1 (Michie Supp. 2000).
172. See H.R. 555, 140th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Sess. § 5 (Del. 2000).
173. See Safe Place for Babies Act, H.R. 1292, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § 2
(Ga. 2000).
174. See Assemb. 2030, 209th Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. § 4 (g) (N.J. 2000).
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Carolina,175 and Oklahoma' 76 proposals contain similar language. In
these states, anonymity is guaranteed, but it is phrased in permissive
language, allowing parents to remain anonymous but not placing any
express limitations on the one accepting the child. 177
The final group goes a step further, moving beyond a mere guaran-
tee of anonymity by affirmatively preventing the one accepting the child
from doing certain things or asking certain questions. At least to a
certain extent, this places the burden of ensuring anonymity on the one
accepting the child by placing more express prohibitions on him or her.
For example, as mentioned above, Florida provides that anyone leaving a
child "has the absolute right to remain anonymous and to leave at any
time and may not be pursued or followed ..... 178 The Kentucky
proposal contained nearly identical language,17 9 and the Wisconsin
proposal also prohibited "coercing" anyone leaving a child into reveal-
ing his or her name or following or pursuing such a person.S0 Similar-
ly, Minnesota provides that "the hospital must not inquire as to the
identity of the mother or the person leaving the newborn ... ."l81 This
is to be contrasted with, for example, the Connecticut law, which allows
questioning but does not require the parent to answer.182
Thus, this third group seems to heighten the guarantee of anonymi-
ty by affirmatively preventing the safe haven from asking questions. In
practical effect, these may be mere semantic differences, since a parent
need not say a word under any of the three approaches. However, the
differences may also reflect a conviction that, to get parents to leave
rather than kill children, it must be clear to them that they will be anony-
mous, or, in the case of the final group, not even asked who they are.
Even this, however, may well be more form than substance: Under any of
the three approaches, however, a parent can walk in, leave a child, and
walk out without saying a word.183
175. See Abandoned Infant Protection Act, H.R. 1616, 1999 Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 2 (N.C.
2000).
176. See H.R. 2148, 47th Leg., 2d Sess. § I (Okla. 2000) (providing anonymity for someone
leaving a newborn, but requiring him or her to state that he or she is the newborn's parent).
177. Michigan also likely fits into this group, although its statute is unclear. It requires those ac-
cepting children to seek certain information, but it does not require that parents give it, allowing an in-
ference that deciding not to answer-and thus staying anonymous-is permissible. See Safe Delivery
of Newborns Law, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 232, § 3(2).
178. Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § I (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
383.50(5)).
179. See S. 188, 134th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 3 (Ky. 2000).
180. See Assemb. 926, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wis. 2000).
181. 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § 1 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.902(l)(b)).
182. Compare H.R. 5023, 2000 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, § 2(b) (allowing
questioning of those leaving children) with 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § I (to be codified at
MiNN. STAT. § 145.902(l)(b)) (forbidding questioning).
183. This statement excludes the Oklahoma proposal, which purported to require individuals to
20001 529
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
While no safe haven law requires that parents furnish any informa-
tion, seven contain provisions by which parents are given an opportunity
to provide such information. Under the South Carolina statute and the
Kentucky proposal, parents are to be provided with forms allowing them
to provide information about the child's health or the health of the
parents. 184 The South Carolina provisions call for the state Department
of Social Services to design such a form, which it will then provide to
hospitals.185 If the parents do not wish to complete the form at the
hospital, they must be given a prepaid and addressed envelope in which
they can return the form by mail later. 186 California has a similar
provision. 187 The Michigan law requires one accepting a child to
attempt to discover certain information, including both parent's identity
and medical histories. 188 The Kentucky proposal similarly called for
"materials to gather health and medical information concerning the
infant and the parents" to be available at hospitals and also called for the
materials to indicate clearly that filling them out was voluntary and could
be done anonymously.189 Finally, the Delaware proposal called on
hospitals to seek similar information. 190
In contrast, the Minnesota and Connecticut enactments and the
North Carolina proposal make seeking such information discretionary,
rather than mandatory, on those receiving a child. The Connecticut law
provides solely that one receiving a child "may request the parent or
agent to provide the name of the parent or agent and information on the
medical history of the infant and parents."191 Using almost identical
language, those receiving children in Minnesota "may ask the mother or
the person leaving the newborn about the medical history of the mother
or newborn .. . ." 192 Finally, the North Carolina proposal stated that
those taking infants into custody "may inquire as to . . . any relevant
medical history."1 9 3  These bills thus seek to address one of the
concerns of those who oppose safe haven legislation: the lack of any
identify whether the child was theirs. See H.R. 2148, 47th Leg., 2d Sess. § I (Okla. 2000).
184. See Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2
(S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(B)(2)); S. 188, 134th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 3
(Ky. 2000).
185. See Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2
(S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(B)(2)).
186. See id. The statute expressly requires that the form include questions about the mother's use
of controlled substances, but it also provides that answers to this question are not admissible in any
prosecution for the use of unlawful substances. See id.
187. See S. 1368, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § I (Cal. 2000) (enacted Sept. 28, 2000).
188. See Safe Delivery of Newborns Law, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 232, § 3(2).
189. See S. 188, 134th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 3 (Ky. 2000).
190. See H.R. 555, 140th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Sess. § 5 (Del. 2000).
191. H.R. 5023, 2000 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, § 2(b).
192. 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § 1 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.902(2)(b)).
193. Abandoned Infant Protection Act, H.R. 1616, 1999 Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 2 (N.C. 2000).
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medical information for the children abandoned. 194 However, they
clearly do not fully answer the criticism, since parents may choose not to
leave information.
Finally, eight states have provisions that do the opposite: They
require the safe haven to provide certain information to anyone leaving a
newborn. The California, 195 Connecticut, 196 Michigan,197 Minnesota,198
and South Carolina statutes, 199 as well as the Delaware, 200 Georgia,201 and
Wisconsin 202 proposals, contain such provisions. The Connecticut law
simply provides that a pamphlet describing the statutory process be
provided to the parent.203 Minnesota allows a hospital merely to provide
information about contacting "relevant social service agencies." 204 The
South Carolina statute and the Georgia and Wisconsin proposals essen-
tially require that the person receiving the child disclose the effect of
doing so, including the impact of parental rights, and inform the parent
of the process that will be followed by the state with respect to the
child. 205 Presumably, these provisions are intended to ensure that the
parents have full information and to allow them to change their minds at
the last minute if they hear something they did not realize initially.
The foregoing sections essentially sketched out the beginning of the
process. To generalize, an eligible person can leave an eligible newborn
at a designated site and, under some laws, must either be asked to give or
must be given certain information. Assuming this happens, and the
parent leaves, the next question is what the safe haven is to do with the
child, both immediately and in the future. These issues are addressed in
the following section.
194. See, e.g., Statement from the American Adoption Congress re: Abandoned Baby Legislation
(last visited June 11, 2000) <http://www.americanadoptioncongress.orglabandoned_baby.htm>.
195. See S. 1368, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2000) (enacted Sept. 28, 2000).
196. See H.R. 5023, 2000 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, § 2(b).
197. See Safe Delivery of Newborns Law, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 232, § 3(l)(d).
198. See 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § 1 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.902(2)(b)).
199. See Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2
(S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(B)(1)).
200. See H.R. 555, 140th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Sess. § 3 (Del. 2000).
201. See Safe Place for Babies Act, H.R. 1292, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § I
(Ga. 2000).
202. See Assemb. 926, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wis. 2000).
203. See H.R. 5023, 2000 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, § 2(b) ("The desig-
nated employee shall provide the parent or agent with a pamphlet describing the process established
under this act.").
204. 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § I (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.902(2)(b)) ("The
hospital may provide the mother or the person leaving the newborn with information about how to
contact relevant social service agencies.").
205. See, e.g., Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. § 2 (S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(B)(1)) ("The hospital or hospital
outpatient facility must offer the person leaving the infant information concerning the legal effect of
leaving the infant with the hospital or hospital outpatient facility.").
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B. POST-ABANDONMENT STATE PROCEDURES
To a greater degree than the other topics addressed in this review of
safe haven legislation, the questions of what a safe haven is to do with a
child it has taken into custody is highly dependent on state law. This is
because the statutorily proscribed duties are often couched in terms of
other, preexisting child protection statutes. Thus, it is less easy, and less
useful, to compare approaches among the bills; to do so comprehensive-
ly, one would ultimately end up reviewing all of a state's child protection
law. Therefore, this section focuses on constructing a brief, thumbnail
sketch of what safe havens do with children, merely noting points at
which states tail off into the their general family and juvenile law.
Initially, most safe haven legislation contains two similar require-
ments. First, the safe haven or individual who accepts actual custody
from a parent is generally to "perform any act necessary, in accordance
with generally accepted standards of professional practice, to protect,
preserve, or aid the physical health or safety of the child during the
temporary physical custody." 2 06 Sometimes this is also phrased as giv-
ing implied consent for any treatment.20 7 There are similar provisions in
California, 20 8 Florida,209 Indiana,2 10 Louisiana, 2 1 1 South Carolina,2 12
Texas, 2 13 and West Virginia, 2 14 as well as the proposals in the Kansas
House2 15 and Senate,2 16 Kentucky, 217 New Jersey, 2 18 North Carolina,2 19
Tennessee, 220 and Wisconsin. 2 2 1 The Connecticut and Minnesota laws,
and the Georgia and Oklahoma bills, do not contain such express
provisions, although it is likely that the legislature intended that hospitals
would ensure the child's health and not ignore obvious physical
problems.
206. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304.5(2)(a) (2000).
207. See S. 188, 134th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ky. 2000).
208. See S. 1368, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2000) (enacted Sept. 28, 2000).
209. See Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § I (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
383.50(3)(a), (4)).
210. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-2.5-1(b) (Michie Supp. 2000).
211. See 2000 La. Acts 109, § 1 (to be codified at LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1704(A)).
212. See Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2
(S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(A)).
213. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.301(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
214. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-1 (Michie Supp. 2000).
215. See H.R. 2927, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 2 (Kan. 2000).
216. See Newborn Infant Protection Act, S. 652, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 1(c) (Kan. 2000).
217. See S. 188, 134th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ky. 2000).
218. See Assemb. 2030, 209th Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. § 4(b)(2) (N.J. 2000).
219. See Abandoned Infant Protection Act, H.R. 1616, 1999 Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 2 (N.C.
2000).
220. See H.R. 2044, 101st Gen. Assemb., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 5 (Tenn. 2000).
221. See Assemb. 926, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wis. 2000).
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The second requirement, present in all states, is that the safe haven
contacts the relevant state or county child welfare agency that it has
received a child within a certain time after receipt. 222 While the time
periods vary, they are generally quite short: Minnesota's, for example, is
twenty-four hours.223 The specific agency, of course, varies from state to
state. That agency then takes physical custody of the child and takes
over his or her care. Often, it is commanded to treat the child as one
taken into custody under a specific state statute or other provision. 224 In
other instances, the agency is simply commanded to take control of the
child, which will then be considered to be in the custody of the agen-
cy. 225 However the statute is phrased, the effect is the same: The safe
haven transfers actual physical custody of the child to the state agency,
which takes over the rest of the process.
It is at this point that the earlier notation about variations in state law
becomes most relevant. In most cases, the statutes do not contain provi-
sions governing how children taken into custody under safe haven laws
are to be treated independent from other, preexisting procedures, with
perhaps minor alternations. Thus, they generally provide some mecha-
nism for terminating parental rights and seeking a permanent home for
the child. 226 Sometimes these provisions are accomplished entirely by
reference to other statutes; 227 others require one step, such as a special
termination of parental rights, after which the child fits into a preexisting
statutory category. 228 Others make slight changes to the existing proce-
dure; Minnesota, for example, provides that children left at safe havens
are to be treated as abandoned children under existing law, except that
the social service agency with control of the child is not to attempt to
222. See, e.g., 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § I (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.902(2)).
223. See 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § 1 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.902(2)).
224. See, e.g., 2000 Minn. Laws 612, ch. 421, § 2 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 260C.217(2))
("[A] newborn left at a hospital under section 145.902 [the safe haven provisions] is considered an
abandoned child."); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.303 (Vernon Supp. 2000) (providing that the
state agency is to treat a child left at a safe haven "as a child taken into possession without a court
order").
225. See, e.g., H.R. 5023, 2000 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, § 3; Act of June
2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § I (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 383.50(7)).
226. See, e.g., H.R. 5023, 2000 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, § 3 (requiring
the Commissioner of Families and Children to "take any action authorized under state law to achieve
safety and permanency for the child").
227. See TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 262.303 (Vernon Supp. 2000) (providing that the state agency is
to treat a child left at a safe haven "as a child taken into possession without a court order" and
requiring it to "take action as required by Section 262.105 with regard to the child"); see also TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(S) (allowing termination of parental rights when a parent has left a child
at a safe haven).
228. See 2000 La. Acts 109, § I (to be codified at LA C PC. CODE A NN. art. 1704(C)) ("The depart-
ment shall file and pursue to judgment in the trial court a petition to terminate the parental rights of the
parents of the relinquished newbom. Upon judgment terminating the parental rights, the newborn shall
be treated as a child whose parents' rights were terminated involuntarily.").
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reunify the child with his or her parents or seek for other relatives. 229
Because of the wide variations among state law and practice on these
issues, these provisions will not be discussed in further detail.230
C. PARENTAL REUNIFICATION PROVISIONS
The above discussion described what happens to abandoned chil-
dren so far as the state is concerned. In most states, that is the whole
story. In a minority of states, however, parents who abandon a newborn
have the ability or opportunity to recover the child within a certain
amount of time after abandoning it by following statutorily proscribed
procedures. All of the other states simply make no mention of reunifica-
tion; presumably, this means that parents who abandon children accord-
ing to a safe haven law are treated the same as parents who abandon
children in other, illegal fashions, with the one key difference that they
will not be pursued or prosecuted. 231 The following section discusses the
minority of bills that do address reunification.
As mentioned, it is a minority that does so--only seven of the states
that have passed or considered such legislation included such provisions.
These are the California,232 Connecticut, 2 33 Florida,234 Louisiana,235 and
Michigan 236 laws, as well as the Georgia 237 and Wisconsin 238 proposals.
As there are so few of them, and because they vary so greatly, each will
be addressed briefly in turn. Perhaps the easiest to discuss are the
Georgia and Wisconsin proposals. The Georgia proposal provided that a
hospital had to inform a parent leaving a child that he or she could
request return of the child for four weeks, and that failure to do so would
result in severance of the parent's rights to the child.239 The proposal
229. See, e.g., 2000 Minn. Laws 612, ch. 421, § 2 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 260C.217(1)).
230. There are a few exceptions to the general rule: Florida, South Carolina, and Kentucky pro-
vide a more detailed procedure for dealing with safe haven abandonments. See 2000 Fla. Laws ch.
188, § 5 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 63.0423); Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743,
113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE A NN. § 20-7-85(E)); S.
188, 134th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 5 (Ky. 2000). Even these statutes, however, essentially contain the
kinds of provisions discussed above, and thus will not be discussed in further detail.
231. The states whose enactments make no provisions for reunification are Alabama, Colorado,
Indiana, Minnesota, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia. This is also true for the proposals
considered by Delaware, the Kansas House and Senate, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.
232. See S. 1368, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § I (Cal. 2000) (enacted Sept. 28, 2000).
233. See H.R. 5023, 2000 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, § 4.
234. See Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § 1 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
383.50(6), § 5 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 63.0423(4)-(10)).
235. See 2000 La. Acts 109, § 1 (to be codified at LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 1705).
236. See Safe Delivery of Newborns Law, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 232, § 10.
237. See Safe Place for Babies Act, H.R. 1292, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § I
(Ga. 2000).
238. See Assemb. 926, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wis. 2000).
239. See Safe Place for Babies Act, H.R. 1292, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § I
(Ga. 2000).
[VOL. 76:511534
ENCOURAGING ABANDONMENT
made no other mention of reunification; thus, it is not clear whether the
child's return to the parent would have been mandatory or discretionary,
or who would make such a decision. 240 The Wisconsin proposal
provided that a parent could reclaim the child until his or her parental
rights were terminated, and then directed a state agency to devise rules
by which this could be accomplished. 24 1  Once the rules were
promulgated, those accepting children would have been required to
provide a copy of the rules and any forms they required to parents
leaving children. 242 Since the proposal did not become law, however,
this never happened.
The Connecticut and Louisiana proposals take opposite approaches.
In Connecticut, a parent leaving a child is provided a bracelet linking
him or her to the child.243 This bracelet conveys to the person holding it
standing to participate in custody hearings for the infant, but it does not
provide a presumption of paternity, maternity, or custody.244 Addition-
ally, one leaving a child may make a request for reunification with the
Commissioner of Children and Families. 245 Notably, the statute does not
provide a time frame within which this must occur.246 After receiving
such a request, the Commissioner is to "identify, contact and investigate
such person or agent to determine if such reunification is appropriate or
if the parental rights of the parent should be terminated." 247 Thus,
reunification is not mandatory: A request simply gives the parent an
opportunity to recover his or her child, but it does not guarantee that it
will happen. 248 California is similar; the child is returned unless a health
prosecutor "knows or reasonably suspects that the child has been the
victim of child abuse or neglect."249
The situation is opposite in Louisiana. There, a mother who has
relinquished her child or a father with notice of the relinquishment has
thirty days to revoke the decision. 250 A father without notice has one
year to file a petition for reunification. 251 The statute provides that the
father's paternity must be established at the state's expense, and if it is
established, he shall be awarded custody of the child.252 Thus, reunifica-
240. See id.
241. See Assemb. 926, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wis. 2000).
242. See id.
243. See H.R. 5023, 2000 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, § 2.
244. See id. § 4.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. Id.
248. See id.
249. S. 1368, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2000) (enacted Sept. 28, 2000).
250. See 2000 La. Acts 109, § 1 (to be codified at LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1705).
251. See id. (to be codified at LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1705(B)).
252. See id.
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tion is clearly mandatory-the court must order reunification if it is
requested within the proscribed time limits. 253 The statute does not con-
tain similar language for the mother, but the language-she "may . . .
revoke her intentions to relinquish the newborn"---especially when read
in conjunction with the mandatory language for the father, indicates that
the effect is the same. 254 Thus, in Louisiana, a parent has the right to
recover his or her child within the time period, not merely the right to
request to do so. 255
The Florida and Michigan statutes provide detailed procedures by
which a parent may reclaim his or her child, which will not be outlined at
length. Essentially, Florida allows a child to be reclaimed "up until the
court enters a judgment terminating his or her parental rights." 256 The
statute provides how such a request is to be made, and the procedures for
the court to follow-if it is made. 257 Notably, the court is not required to
grant such a request; rather, it may appoint a guardian ad litem to
evaluate the parents and determine the newborn's best interests. 2 58
Additionally, the court may not deny reunification solely because the
child was abandoned pursuant to the statute. 259 In Michigan, a parent
must file a request for reunification within twenty-eight days of aban-
doning the child.260 The court must then determine via DNA or other
testing if the petitioner is the child's parent; if he or she is, the court will
hold a hearing to determine whether the child should be returned to the
parent, using a best interests standard. 261
D. PARENTAL AND SAFE HAVEN IMMUNITY
Virtually all safe haven laws provide some form of immunity from
prosecution for abandonment to parents who comply with the statute.262
Without these provisions, the laws would be essentially worthless, because
there would be no incentive to follow the abandonment procedures
253. See id.
254. Id. (to be codified at LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1705(A)).
255. See id. (to be codified at LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1705). Presumably, the court would still
have the ability to deny a request in the cases of clear physical abuse, although the statute does not
expressly provide for this.
256. Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § I (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
383.50(6)).
257. See Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § 5 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
63.0423(4)-(10)).
258. See Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § 5 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
63.0423(7)).
259. See Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § 5 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
63.0423(7)(c)).
260. See Safe Delivery of Newborns Law, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 232, § 10.
261. See id. §§ 10-14.
262. The one exception is Michigan, whose statute is silent as to liability. See id.
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instead of more traditionally abandoning the child if they led to the
same legal consequences. Additionally, many provide some level of
criminal and civil immunity to anyone accepting a child pursuant to safe
haven authority. These provisions are the subject of this section.
First, the immunity from prosecution provisions come in three basic
forms. All have essentially the same content: They move abandonment
pursuant to the statute outside the realm of criminal liability, thus allow-
ing abandonment to occur. However, there are two main ways of phras-
ing this protection, the first of which actually comprises two different
methods of describing the immunity. The first main way effectively
prevents charges ever from being brought against a parent for abandon-
ing a child according to the statute. This is accomplished two ways.
First, two laws and four proposals provide that abandonment according
to the statutory procedures simply will not constitute a violation of the
relevant state laws. This is true in the Connecticut 263 and Florida264 laws,
as well as the Kansas House, 265 Kentucky, 266, Oklahoma,267 and
Tennessee 268 proposals. Second, the California, 269 Minnesota 270 and
South Carolina 271 laws and the Georgia,272 Kansas Senate, 273 and
Wisconsin 274 proposals provide that a parent may not be prosecuted for
the relevant state crime if he or she complies with the law. In either case,
the prosecution would be theoretically unable to initiate proceedings if it
knew, or continue them if it learned, that a defendant had complied with
the statute.
The second major method provides an affirmative defense to those
charged with the relevant state crime. The Alabama, 275 Colorado, 276
Indiana, 277 Louisiana, 278 Texas,279 and West Virginia 280 legislation
263. See H.R. 5023, 2000 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2000 Conn. Acts 207, §§ 6, 7.
264. See Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § 8 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
827.035).
265. See H.R. 2927, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 2 (Kan. 2000).
266. See S. 188, 134th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ky. 2000).
267. See H.R. 2148, 47th Leg., 2d Sess. § I (Okla. 2000).
268. See H.R. 2044, 101st Gen. Assemb., 2000 Reg. Sess. §§ 6, 7 (Tenn. 2000).
269. See S. 1368, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2000) (enacted Sept. 28, 2000).
270. See 2000 Minn. Laws 612, ch. 421, § 3 (to be codified at MiNN. STAT. § 609.3785).
271. See Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2
(S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(G)).
272. See Safe Place for Babies Act, H.R. 1292, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § I
(Ga. 2000).
273. See Newborn Infant Protection Act, S. 652, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 2(b) (Kan. 2000).
274. See Assemb. 926, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wis. 2000).
275. See H.R. 115, 2000 Reg. Sess., 2000 Ala. Acts 760, § 3.
276. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-401(9) (2000).
277. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-4(c)(1) (Michie Supp. 2000).
278. See 2000 La. Acts 109, § 1 (to be codified at LA. Ctv. CODE ANN. art. 1703(B)).
279. See Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041(h) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
280. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6E-4 (Michie Supp. 2000).
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employ this method, as do the Delaware, 281 and New Jersey 282 proposals.
The difference between this approach and the first may not mean much
in practice. In theory, however, it places the burden on defendants, who
generally must raise and prove affirmative defenses. Under the first
approach, however, it is not clear on whom the burden of proving
compliance would be placed; if it were on the parents, it might effective-
ly function as an affirmative defense.
Additionally, eight states condition immunity on the child's not
being harmed. This is true in the Florida, 28 3 Minnesota, 284 and South
Carolina 285 laws as well as the proposals in Delaware, 286 Kansas Senate, 287
and Kentucky. 288 The South Carolina statute does not expressly
condition eligibility for abandonment on a child's health, but it provides
that the immunity provisions do "not apply to prosecution for the
infliction of harm upon infant other than the harm inherent in
abandonment." 289 The North Carolina proposal contained a similar
provision. 290
The second type of immunity, offered by all but five states, is for
those accepting children. 29 1 These provisions are expressed in many
different forms. The precise differences among the various phrasings, as
well as differences between the states who use the same language, at least
insofar as they concern the substantive law of torts, are beyond the scope
of this article, which intends merely to denote how different states have
approached safe haven legislation. Thus, the following discussion
focuses on the general form of the various statutory texts.
Perhaps the broadest expressions of immunity are found in the
Alabama statute and the Delaware and Kansas Senate proposals. The
281. See H.R. 555, 140th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Sess. § I (Del. 2000).
282. See Assemb. 2030, 209th Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. § 4(e) (N.J. 2000).
283. See Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § 8 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
827.035).
284. See 2000 Minn. Laws 612, ch. 421, § 3 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 609.3785).
285. See Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2
(S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(G)).
286. See H.R. 555, 140th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Sess. § I (Del. 2000).
287. See Newborn Infant Protection Act, S. 652, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 2(b) (Kan. 2000).
288. See S. 188, 134th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ky. 2000).
289. Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2
(S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(G)).
290. See Abandoned Infant Protection Act, H.R. 1616, 1999 Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 5 (N.C.
2000). The North Carolina proposal would have allowed abandoment to be a mitigating factor in
sentencing for a child abuse conviction. See id.
291. Those states that do not have any sort of immunity provision are the Connecticut, Indiana,
Texas, and West Virginia enactments, and the Kansas House proposal. The Georgia proposal
contained a very limited immunity, providing that safe havens could not be liable for civil damages for
failing to discharge their duty to make certain disclosures to, and provide information for, parents
leaving children. See Safe Place for Babies Act, H.R. 1292, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Reg.
Sess. § 1 (Ga. 2000).
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Alabama statute states that "[n]o person or other entity subject to the
provisions of this act shall be liable to any person for any claim for
damages as a result of any action taken pursuant to the requirements of
this act. .. ."292 Equally broad was the Delaware proposal, which stated
that those acting under the statute were "absolutely immune" from civil
and criminal liability. 293 The Kansas Senate proposal similarly provided
that safe havens had to do whatever was necessary to protect the physical
health of the child and would "be immune from liability for any injury
to the infant that may result therefrom." 294 More limited, but still broad,
is South Carolina's statute, which provides immunity for any act
authorized by the statute so long as the safe haven complies with all
provisions of the statute.295
Nine states provide an arguably more limited immunity, keying
protection to good faith or a similar standard. Colorado, for example,
holds that "[a] firefighter or hospital staff member shall incur no civil or
criminal liability for any good faith acts or omissions .. .. *"296
California has a similar provision. 297 Louisiana similarly provides that
no cause of action may be brought "for good faith actions relative to
the relinquishment of a ... newborn," 298 while Minnesota safe havens
are immune "from any criminal liability that otherwise might result
from their actions, if they are acting in good faith in receiving a
newborn, and are immune from any civil liability that otherwise might
result from merely receiving a newborn." 299 The Michigan law provides
immunity from everything except "gross negligence or willful or
wanton misconduct." 300 Similar provisions were contained in the New
Jersey,301 North Carolina,302 Oklahoma30 3 and Wisconsin 304 proposals.
Finally, two states have provisions arguably identical, but semanti-
cally different, from these. First, Florida provides any firefighter or
emergency medical technician with immunity, and a hospital or any of
its licensed health care professionals are "immune from criminal or civil
292. H.R. 115, 2000 Reg. Sess., 2000 Ala. Acts 760, § 5.
293. See H.R. 555, 140th Gen. Assemb., 1999-2000 Sess. § 7 (Del. 2000).
294. Newborn Infant Protection Act, S. 652, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § l(c) (Kan. 2000).
295. See Safe Haven for Abandoned Babies Act, H.R. 4743, 113th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2
(S.C. 2000) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-85(H)).
296. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304.5(3) (2000).
297. See S. 1368, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. § I (Cal. 2000) (enacted Sept. 28, 2000).
298. 2000 La. Acts 109, § 1 (to be codified at LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1704(A)).
299. 2000 Minn. Laws 611-12, ch. 421, § 1 (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.902(1)).
300. Safe Delivery of Newborns Law, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 232, § 2(4).
301. See Assemb. 2030, 209th Leg., 1999 Reg. Sess. § 4(f) (N.J. 2000).
302. See Abandoned Infant Protection Act, H.R. 1616, 1999 Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 2 (N.C.
2000).
303. See H.R. 2148, 47th Leg., 2d Sess. § 1 (Okla. 2000).
304. See Assemb. 926, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wis. 2000).
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liability for acting in good faith in accordance with this section," but it
goes on to provide that "[n]othing in this subsection limits liability for
negligence." 305 Second, the Kentucky proposal provided that "[a]ny
person performing medical care, diagnostic testing, or medical treatment
shall be immune from criminal or civil liability for having performed the
act." 306  Like Florida, however, it also continues by stating that
"[n]othing in this subsection shall limit liability for negligence." 307
The foregoing section has provided an overview of how safe haven
laws are constructed. It attempted, as it were, to paint with broad strokes,
noting, explaining, and distinguishing among major approaches to
similar issues. However, each piece of safe haven legislation has to fit
into a preexisting family and juvenile law structure. The following
section explores the North Dakota framework into which any safe haven
law would have to fit.
III. LOSS OF PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER NORTH DAKOTA LAW
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." 308 The United States Supreme
Court has stated that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
"like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, 'guarantees more than fair
process."'309 Rather, "[tihe Clause also includes a substantive compo-
nent that 'provides heightened protection against government interfer-
ence with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.' 310
One such liberty interest is that of "parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children[; this] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by [the United States Supreme] Court." 311
The scope and definition of a parent's fundamental right to the custody,
care and control of his or her child has substantially developed over the
last seventy-five years of Supreme Court jurisprudence. 3 12 At this stage
of that development, it is clear that a parent's right to make decisions
305. Act of June 2, 2000, 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 188, § I (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ch.
383.50(3)(b), (4)).
306. S. 188, 134th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. § 3 (Ky. 2000).
307. Id.
308. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
309. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2059 (2000) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 719 (1997)).
310. Id. at 2060 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720).
311. Id.
312. See id. (covering the case law development of a parent's fundamental right to the custody,
care, and control of his or her child).
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concerning the custody, care and control of his or her children is duly
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 313
However, the implications of this right on a safe haven law have not
been addressed by any court. Thus, the relationship between the funda-
mental right to parenting and statutes enabling parents to leave children
at safe havens with the intention of relinquishing parental rights is
unclear. Further, it is not clear how safe haven laws will constitutionally
account for the fundamental rights of one parent when the other drops
off the child.314 The goal of this analysis is to determine how North
Dakota should address the typical scenario in which the mother of a
newborn wishes to leave her newborn at a medical facility. An important
part of such an analysis includes addressing the father's due process
rights, and addressing a mother's right to terminate the parent-child
relationship. 315
This section addresses these issues by considering the various ways
that one can lose parental rights under current North Dakota law. First is
a true abandonment: What would happen in North Dakota if a child has
been abandoned and the police or another governmental body is unable
to locate the parents. Second, this section addresses what types of action
by a parent allow the state to terminate parental rights involuntarily.
Finally, this section summarizes the current procedure allowing a parent
voluntarily to terminate his or her parental rights through the mechanism
of adoption.
A. ABANDONED CHILDREN UNDER EXISTING NORTH DAKOTA LAW
Currently, if a newborn baby was found abandoned and alive in
North Dakota, the police officer responding to the scene would first be
required to make a reasonable investigation regarding the whereabouts
of the parents of the child. If the officer was unable to determine the
parent or parents of the child, the officer would take the child into
protective custody. 316 If further investigation revealed the identity of the
parents, either or both parents may be guilty of a class C felony for a
failure to provide adequate shelter and care.317 If further investigation
did not reveal the identity of the parents, the child would be placed
313. See id.
314. As discussed above, some safe haven laws and proposals provide a mechanism by which a
parent may recover a child. See supra Part II.C. However, the constitutional adequacy of these
provisions has yet to be determined.
315. It should be noted that the gender roles could easily be reversed; however, this choice of
gender roles reflects what seems to be a more common scenario.
316. See N.D. CErNT. CODE § 25-03.1-25 (1995) (detailing procedures for taking an individual into
protective custody in emergency situations).
317. See id. § 14-07-15 (1997) (stating penalities for the abandonment of a child).
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under the temporary custody of the county social services department,
which may in turn petition the court to terminate the parental rights
under the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, found at North Dakota Century
Code section 27-20-44.318
Thus, if a parent actually abandoned a child, that act would be
grounds for loss of parental rights. However, parents may also have their
rights terminated even if they do not actually or physically abandon
their child. This is the subject of the next section.
B. INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
In certain circumstances, a court may by judicial decree terminate a
person's parental rights in his or her children. If a parent's act or
failure to act deprives a child, and the deprivation is currently causing or
will in the future cause serious physical, mental or moral harm, the
county social service department may petition the court to terminate the
parental rights of such parent. 319 The type of behavior that may cause
the court to consider terminating parental rights includes prolonged
alcohol or other substance abuse, or a failure to discontinue abusing
alcohol or other substances after receiving treatment.320 Other behavior
that may justify terminating parental rights includes both verbal and
physical abuse directed towards the child or the parent being repeatedly
incarcerated. 321 Essentially, if a parent's actions are causing or are likely
to cause serious harm to a child, the court will consider terminating that
parent's parental rights. After all, as the North Dakota Supreme Court
has stated, "the primary purpose of [North Dakota Century Code
chapter 27-20] is to protect the welfare of the children." 322
The North Dakota Supreme Court has routinely applied a three-part
statutorily based test to determine whether a lower court made the proper
determination to terminate a parent's rights. 323 Since the termination of
a parent's rights also involves a child, the lower court terminating a
parent's rights is most often a juvenile court. While the North Dakota
Supreme Court is not bound by the decision of a juvenile court, it does
give the lower court decision "appreciable weight." 324
318. See id. § 27-20-44 (Supp. 1999) (outlining procedure for terminating parental rights).
319. See id.
320. See In re A.M., 1999 ND 195, 8, 601 N.W.2d 253, 256 (suggesting that a parent's
continued abuse of alcohol may cause a child to be deprived).
321. See In re A.R., 2000 ND 130, 4, 6, 612 N.W.2d 569, 570 (affirming the trial court's
decision to terminate parental rights when the parent physically abused her child in the past, had a
history of substance abuse, and was repeatedly incarcerated).
322. In re A.M., 6, 601 N.W.2d at 255.
323. See id. 1 7 (suggesting that the three-part test is derived from section 27-20-44(1)(b) of the
North Dakota Century Code).
324. See id.
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The three-part test first requires a determination of whether the
child is "deprived." 325 Second, the court determines whether the condi-
tions and the causes of the deprivation are likely to continue. 326 Third,
the court determines whether the child is suffering or will in the future
suffer "serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm." 327 The bur-
den of proof for a parental rights termination proceeding is on the state,
which must prove all three elements by clear and convincing evidence. 328
The North Dakota Supreme Court recently applied this three-step
analysis in In re A.R.329 In re A.R. involved an appeal from a juvenile
court's determination that K.G., the mother of A.R., should have her
parental rights terminated. 330 Employing the three-part framework, the
juvenile court had determined that A.R. was a deprived child, that the
conditions causing A.R.'s deprivation were likely to continue, and that
A.R. would likely suffer serious physical, mental, moral or emotional
harm in the future. 331 Some facts leading the juvenile court to such a
conclusion included: Evidence that K.G. had physically and verbally
abused A.R.; K.G. had a history of substance abuse; K.G. had been
incarcerated on numerous occasions; and K.G.'s role in A.R.'s upbring-
ing was very limited. 332 The juvenile court further determined that
A.R.'s behavior suggested that she was a deprived child. 333 A.R. had
stolen a car in an attempt to run away from home, and A.R. had devel-
oped some substance abuse problems of her own. 334 Therefore, the
juvenile court determined that K.G.'s parental rights should be
terminated. 335
After reviewing this evidence, the North Dakota Supreme Court
upheld the termination of K.G.'s parental rights. 336 Thus, A.R. came
into the protective custody of the state, probably into a foster home or
similar care. While it is not known from the case, A.R. may possibly be
awaiting adoption. Adoption, the final broad method of losing parental
rights, is the topic of the next section.
325. See id.
326. See id.
327. Id.
328. See id.
329. 2000 ND 130, 612 N.W.2d 569.
330. In re A.R., 2000 ND 130, 1 1,612 N.W.2d 569, 570.
331. See id. 13.
332. See id. 14.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. See id. On appeal, K.G. was unable to meet her burden of calling to the court's attention
evidence because she did not provide a transcript of the evidentiary hearing. See id. 5.
336. See id. 6.
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C. THE ADOPTION PROCEDURES
North Dakota has adopted the Uniform Parentage Act337 as well as
the Revised Uniform Adoption Act.338 As such, there is an existing
statutory framework with respect to terminating parental rights in the
adoption context. 339 While not specifically included in the statutes
concerning adoption, there is a general requirement that someone is able
to adopt a child before one loses all parental rights through adoption. 340
Otherwise, parents would be absolved of parental responsibility by
simply placing a child up for adoption. An interesting area outside the
scope of this analysis is the partial or "weak" adoption in which the
natural parent is allowed some general visitation of his/her child at the
behest of the adoptive parents.341
The following discussion outlines the basic procedure for adoption
in North Dakota. This discussion is not intended as a comprehensive
review of all issues concerning adoption; rather, it seeks to frame the
main issues in order to contrast them to the safe haven procedures
reviewed above. As discussed below, the first step is to determine the
status of the father, as that determines whether he is entitled to notice and
must consent to any future adoption.342
1. When is the Father Entitled to Notice?
North Dakota Century Code section 14-17-24 controls the proce-
dure that North Dakota currently uses for the termination of the
parent-child relationship by adoption. 343 When a mother wishes to place
her child in an adoptive family, the father of the child shall be given
notice of the proceeding to terminate parental rights. 344 North Dakota
Century Code section 14-17-24 explains that the court shall first proceed
337. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-17 (1997 & Supp. 1999).
338. See id. ch. 14-15 (1997 & Supp. 1999).
339. See id. § 14-17-24 (1997) (providing for termination of parental rights).
340. This assumes, of course, that the parent has not already lost his or her rights as discussed
above.
341. See generally Candace M. Zierdt, Make New Parents But Keep the Old, 69 N.D. L. REV.
497 (1993).
342. According to the North Dakota Supreme Court, "Due Process protection extends to the inter-
est of the biological father in developing a relationship with his child." R.A.K. v. M.E.Z., 514 N.W.2d
670, 672 (N.D. 1994) (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (1983)). The court continued:
"However, this interest 'is of limited duration as a constitutionally significant interest because of the
child's need for early permanence and stability in parental relationships."' Id. (citing Abernathy v.
Baby Boy, 437 S.E.2d 25, 28 (S.C. 1993)). Thus, while a father has an protected interest, it can be
overcome in certain circumstances, as discussed below.
343. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-24 (1997) (outlining the procedure to terminate parental
rights).
344. See id. § 14-17-24(5).
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to determine the father of the child.345 The court is statutorily entitled to
presume paternity of the child under certain situations.346 One such
situation is where a man and the child's natural mother are married and
the child is born during the marriage, or when the child is born within
three hundred days after the termination of the marriage.347 Further, a
man may also be presumed to be the father of a child born out of
wedlock if, after the child's birth, that man marries the child's natural
mother and acknowledges his paternity in writing, and either consents to
being named the child's father on the birth certificate or is obligated to
support the child either by promise or court order. 348 Finally, a man
may be presumed to be the father of a child if, after genetic testing, he is
not eliminated as a possible father and is within a ninety-five percent
statistical probability of being the child's father.349
If the father of the child cannot be presumed, the court must inquire
into the paternity of the child subject to adoption. 350 Such an inquiry
must include whether the mother was married at the time of conception
of the child or at any time thereafter; whether the mother was cohabiting
with a man at the time of conception or birth of the child; whether the
mother has received from any man support payments or promises of
support with respect to the child or in connection with her pregnancy; or
whether any man has formally or informally acknowledged or declared
that man's possible paternity of the child.351 If, after such an inquiry is
performed, the court is still unable to determine the father of the child,
the court shall enter an order terminating the father's parental rights with
respect to such child.352 Such an order will be uncontestable by any
person on any ground including fraud, misrepresentation, failure to give
notice, or lack of jurisdiction. 353 Assuming, however, the opposite is true
and the court is able to determine the father of the child or at least
identify possible fathers of the child, each possible father must be given
notice of the proceeding to terminate his parental right. 354
345. See id. § 14-17-24(2).
346. See id. § 14-17-04 (1997) (stating situations where paternity will be presumed).
347. See id. § 14-17-04(l)(a). Interestingly, the marriage itself need not be a valid marriage;
rather, the parties need only attempt to marry for the presumption to carry. See id. § 14-17-04 (l)(b).
In other words, even if the court could later declare the marriage invalid, a court is entitled to still
presume paternity of a child born in such an attempted marriage. See § 14-17-04(l)(b)(1).
348. See id. § 14-17-04(l)(a).
349. See id. § 14-17-04(l)(f).
350. See id. § 14-17-24(4).
351. See id. § 14-17-24(2).
352. See id. § 14-17-24(4).
353. See id.
354. See id. § 14-17-24(5).
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2. When is the Father Not Entitled to Notice?
Once the father of a child is determined, he is entitled to notice of
any court proceeding terminating his parental rights, and must consent
in writing to the adoption of his child. 355 However, under certain circum-
stances, a father, even if known, need not consent to the adoption.
Additionally, if the father's consent is not required, he is not entitled to
notice of the adoption proceedings.
Generally, a father's consent to an adoption proceeding is not
required if he has deserted his child without affording a means of
identification or has abandoned his child completely. 356 Further, con-
sent to adopt is not required of a parent who has failed significantly
without justifiable cause for a period of at least one year to communicate
with his child or provide support for his child.357 The legislature did not
define the term "abandonment" in the revised uniform adoption act;
however, the North Dakota Supreme Court has explained that whether a
parent has abandoned his or her child is a question of fact to be estab-
lished with clear and convincing evidence. 358 Generally, in determining
whether a parent has abandoned a child, courts will look at factors
including the parent's contact and communication with the child, the
parent's love, care, and affection towards the child, and finally the intent
of the parent.359 Other relevant factors include the parent's acceptance
of obligations such as caring for, protecting, supporting, educating,
giving moral guidance to and providing a home for the child.360
These guidelines suggest ways of determining the abandonment of
a child after the child's birth; however, it is not clear whether one could
abandon a child prior to the birth of that child in a manner sufficient to
excuse the court from requiring that parent's consent to the adoption
proceeding. For example, someone may not have a stable relationship
with the mother of the child or may provide little support during the
pregnancy; however, it is possible that the father could develop a relation-
ship with a child after the child's birth. Therefore, it may not be fair to
treat the father as though he has abandoned his child before the birth.
However, a court could find that abandonment has occurred if the father
provided no moral or financial support or had no contact with the
355. See id. § 14-15-05 (stating whose consent is required for an adoption).
356. See id. § 14-15-06.
357. See id. § 14-05-06(1)(b).
358. See In re A.M.B., 514 N.W.2d 670, 672 (N.D. 1994). But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02
(Supp. 1999) (defining abandonment within the juvenile context).
359. See In reA.M.B., 514 N.W.2d at 672.
360. See id.
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mother from the time the child was conceived until the child was
dropped off at a safe haven.
Assuming that the father has either consented or that his consent is
not required, the final issue is how a mother relinquishes her parental
rights. This is addressed in the following section.
3. When May a Mother Terminate Her Parental Rights?
When a mother, or either parent for that matter, wants to end the
parent-child relationship in North Dakota, he or she may do so accord-
ing to the statutorily created procedure of adoption. 36 1 In short, she
does so by relinquishing her rights in writing in the presence of a judge
or a representative of an agency taking custody of the child.362
The parent who wishes to give a child up for adoption may also be
required to give the adoption agency certain information designated as
"nonidentifying." 363 This information may include the parent's age,
heritage, education, physical appearance, health history, religious back-
ground, as well as the reasons for placing the child in an adoptive
family. 364 Further, if the parent has abandoned his or her child, the
court has statutory authority to terminate the parental rights of the
abandoning parent. 365 The North Dakota legislature has not defined
"abandonment" within the Revised Uniform Adoption Act. However
they have defined abandonment within the Uniform Juvenile Court
Act. 366 This definition may be helpful as a guide for aiding the courts in
361. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-19 (1997) (defining the procedure for the relinquishment and
termination of parent and child relationship).
362. See id. § 14-15-19(2)(a).
363. See id. § 14-15-01.
364. See id.
365. See id. § 14-15-19.
366. See id. § 27-20-02 (Supp. 1999):
1. "Abandon" means:
a. As to a parent of a child not in the custody of that parent, failure by the
noncustodial parent significantly without justifiable cause:
(1) To communicate with the child; or
(2) To provide for the care and support of the child as required by law; or
b. As to a parent of a child in that parent's custody:
(1) To leave the child for an indefinite period without making firm and agreed
plans, with the child's immediate caregiver, for the parent's resumption of
physical custody;
(2) Following the child's birth or treatment at a hospital, to fail to arrange for the
child's discharge within ten days after the child no longer requires hospital
care; or
(3) To willfully fail to furnish food, shelter, clothing, or medical attention
reasonably sufficient to meet the child's needs.
2. "Abandoned infant" means a child who has been abandoned before reaching the age
of one year.
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determining whether a parent has abandoned his or her child, thereby
allowing the court to terminate the parental rights.
As the foregoing discussion shows, there are currently three general
ways in which one can lose parental rights in North Dakota. First, one
could physically abandon a child, which would form the basis for
termination of parental rights. The second method involves less drastic
parental failures, which can allow a court to order an involuntary termi-
nation of parental rights. Finally, a parent may voluntarily give up his or
her child for adoption. Clearly, these categories are not entirely exclu-
sive: Physical abandonment is really nothing more than the ultimate
ground for terminating parental rights, and children taken from parents
via that method may end up in the adoption system. Broadly speaking,
however, these are the three current methods by which parents perma-
nently lose rights to their children. If the legislature chooses to add
another method in the form of a safe haven law, it will exist alongside,
and surely will overlap with, these currently existing procedures.
IV. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, a number of North Dakota doctors and hospi-
tals are urging the North Dakota Legislature to adopt safe haven legisla-
tion at its 2001 session. 367 In response to this urging, the attorney
general has indicated that she will draft such legislation. 368 Thus, legisla-
tors may soon be debating what kind of safe haven law North Dakota
should adopt, if it decides to adopt one at all.
As the above discussion shows, many states have either adopted or
considered some form of safe haven law-and more may have joined
their ranks by the time of publication-meaning North Dakota will be
able to model its legislation on any number of examples. 369 In so doing,
it will have to make choices from among the major approaches, such as
whether to adopt a broad or narrow definition of where children may be
left; whether children may be left until they are three or thirty days old;
and whether to provide reunification procedures. 370 In addition, it will
need to fit the law into the preexisting statutory framework for abandon-
ment, termination of parental rights, and adoption, deciding whether and
how to integrate the new procedures into these existing structures. 371
367. See MacDonald, supra note 10.
368. See MacDonald, supra note 10.
369. See generally supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text for those states which have adopted
some form of safe haven law; supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text for those states which have
considered or are condidering adoption of some form of safe haven law.
370. See generally supra Part II.
371. See generally supra Part Il1.
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More fundamental, though, is the question whether North Dakota
should have a safe haven law at all. As discussed above, such statutes
have not been without detractors: Adoptee-rights groups, those who see
these laws as condoning abdication of parental responsibility, and others
have joined to oppose them. 372 While many of the unpassed bills surely
failed because of time pressure or legislative indifference, it is logical to
assume that at least some legislators actively opposed their adoption.
Arrayed against them, of course, are the legislators who have made safe
haven laws one of the hottest items of the 1999-2000 session; a little over
a year ago, only Texas had a safe haven law, and now over half the states
have at least considered adopting one.
The more profound question of whether to adopt a safe haven law is
generally beyond the scope of this discussion. Rather, this Article has
attempted merely to provide a kind of catalog of options from among
which the legislature could choose when making these decisions, as well
as to mark the places at which any new law will collide with existing
procedures. Whether the state should choose from among them at all is,
to understate the issue, a far more difficult question.
372. See generally supra notes 36, 158 194, and accompanying text.
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